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There is a well-documented Pre-Reflective Hostility against Machine Art (PRHMA), 
exemplified by the sentiments of fear and anxiety. How can it be explained? The present paper 
attempts to find the answer to this question by surveying a considerable amount of research 
on machine art. It is found that explanations of PRHMA based on the (alleged) fact that machine 
art lacks an element that is (allegedly) found in human art (for example, autonomy) do not 
work. Such explanations cannot account for the sentiments of fear and anxiety present in 
PRHMA, because the art receiver could simply turn to human art for finding the element she 
is looking for. By contrast, an explanation based on the idea that machine art is “symbolically” 
a threat to human survival can be successful, since the art receiver’s turning from machine art 
to human art does not eliminate the (alleged) “symbolic” threat machine art poses for human 
survival. If there is a pre-reflective belief or feeling that machine art is such a threat, then it is 
perfectly understandable why humans exhibit a pre-reflective hostility against machine art.  
 robots, machines, art, fear, anxiety, survival, technology, autonomy, spirituality, 
consciousness 
Coeckelbergh has recently raised an issue which, despite its huge importance, remains 
marginalized in debates in philosophy of technology: 
Why do we humans insist on being the only artists? If machines were artists, would this be a problem and 
why? [...] Why do we want to colonize and dominate the artistic domain? It is not clear what keeps us from 
opening it up to [...] machines [...], or what keeps us from recognizing that these are already “invading” the 
domain. (Coeckelbergh 2017, 296)  
Coeckelbergh asks about the reason why humans display a pre-reflective hostility against 
machine art and thereby exclude it from art’s domain. The present paper attempts to answer 
this question, especially in relation to robotic art. While the literature on the relation between art 
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and technology increases exponentially each year, authors have hitherto paid minimal attention to  
that hostility’s causes. 
“Robot” originally signified a machine that is put to hard work or slavery (robota in Czech) 
and has no ability to escape this destiny; it had precisely this sense in Č apek’s 1920 play Rossum’s 
Universal Robots, where the term was first used (Bar-Cohen et al. 2009, 7; Stephens and Heffernan 
2016, 34). In our days the term has another meaning: it signifies a machine that has “the capacity  
for sensing and self-guided behaviour” (Penny 2016, 49). As Penny notes, “as its quality of self-
guidance declines, so does its claim to the moniker ‘robot’” (Penny 2016, 49-50). Robots are  
now “quasi-intelligent machines whose control systems are partially under human control, and 
partially autonomous” (Penny 2016, 50), and there are signs that they will soon enjoy full autonomy 
(Bar-Cohen et al. 2009). 
Machines are everywhere in human society and are already performing a myriad of tasks  
(Bar-Cohen et al. 2009, 9, 11, 13), but can they also create art, “one of the most cherished human 
endeavours” (Poltronieri et al. 2018, 5)? This question is raised more and more frequently in 
philosophy of technology (Coeckelbergh 2017; Still and d’Inverno 2019).  
 Since the eighteenth century there have been numerous instances of robots or automata  
to which the label “artist” has been attached. As noted by Stephens and Heffernan, 
 
[t]hroughout the 1700s, a series of unsettlingly lifelike mechanical figures had held audiences spellbound 
by performing astonishing feats of skill and intelligence on the public stage. [...] These automata, like the 
other mechanical figures that so fascinated eighteenth-century publics, were not only the products of great 
art and technical skill: they were themselves highly skilled producers of art, participating in cultural activities 
widely understood to be definitively human. (Stephens and Heffernan 2016, 31, my emphasis)  
 
An example of such a mechanical “artist” was Jaquet-Droz’s “Musical Lady,” an automaton 
of the eighteenth century that has been described as “one of the world’s first programmable robots” 
(Stephens and Heffernan 2016, 29). The “Musical Lady” is seated before a piano and “when 
animated, her articulated fingers press down on the individual keys, so that the figure actually  
plays the music the spectator then hears” (Stephens and Heffernan 2016, 29). Moreover, “her chest 
rise[s] and fall[s] as she played, making her appear not only alive, but emotional” (Stephens  
and Heffernan 2016, 30). Jaquet-Droz made also the “Draftsman,” an anthropomorphic machine 
programmed to draw various objects, including a portrait of Marie-Antoinette, and the “Writer,”  
a humanoid automaton programmed to write sentences, including “I think therefore I am” (Bar-
Cohen et al. 2009, 9).  
In the nineteenth century, even though the emphasis is put on machines contributing  
to mass production, there are reports of a large number of programmed machine artists. In the 
second quarter of the twentieth century a big change occurred, as in the1940s Grey Walter created 
two robots that exhibited some autonomy. According to Penny, this marks robotic art’s proper 
beginning (Penny 1989). After the Second World War more and more robots have started having  
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a non-human appearance and behaving in a more complex way qua artists than before (Stephens  
and Heffernan 2016, 35). In 1955 Tinguely presented his “Metamatics,” non-anthropomorphic 
machines that created abstract expressionist drawings (Satz and Wood 2009, 145). Voyager, 
constructed between 1986 and 1988, and Shimon, constructed in 2017, are robots improvising 
music (Lewis 1999; Weinberg et al. 2007; Hoffman and Weinberg 2011; Lösel 2018, 199-200).  
In the first decade of the 2000s Mura presented his “ant-robots,” which created abstract art 
autonomously and even emotionally (Moura 2016). Recently, it has been reported that a machine  
with a complicated algorithm can transform photographs into paintings exhibiting the style of Van  
Gogh (Parkinson 2015) and that Patrick Tresset has constructed a robot that can autonomously draw  
excellent portraits of people sitting before it (Brown 2011).  
It is apparent in the literature that human artists, computational researchers, and engineers 
involved in machine art take it upon themselves to prove that the pre-reflective view that there  
is something exclusively human about art is wrong, to wit, that machines can also create art.  
Yet, what I find fascinating is the fact that there is such a pre-reflective view in the first place  
and that, as it is well-documented, it is accompanied by fear and anxiety, or, if you like, a  
hostility, towards machine art. It is to this Pre-Reflective Hostility against Machine Art (hereafter 
“PRHMA”), exemplified most strongly by fear and anxiety, that I turn my attention in the  
current essay.  
PRHMA ranges from milder to stronger expressions. Moura, for example, refers to the  
claim of “common sense” that “machines can only make something that looks like art because  
a human builds them, programs them and hits the button. Hence the art made in such a fashion  
is still essentially human [...]” (Moura 2016, 255). PRHMA takes a much stronger form in Nake’s 
report that the early exhibitions of computer art caused “nervous, hostile, furious” reactions  
by the public (Poltronieri et al. 2018, 5). Audiences left the exhibitions wondering “[i]f these 
pictures were done by use of a computer, how could they possibly be art. The idea was ridiculous!” 
(Poltronieri et al. 2018, 5). As Poltronieri et al. point out, “this tension between technology  
and art remains [...] even today” (Poltronieri et al. 2018, 9), a diagnosis shared by Shanken and 
Nunez among numerous others (Shanken 2016; Nunez 2016). That is to say, there is even today, at 
the pre-reflective level, fear and anxiety, a strong hostility, towards machine art. In an interview,  
Kidner notes that when he first started exploring computer art, “I took the view that the  
computer was an unwelcome competitor and I tried to imagine problems that would confound 
what I then regarded as an inhuman and unwieldy monster” (Kidner 2018, 85). Lovejoy reports  
that “the Depression of the 1930s brought fear and despair [towards technology], a mood  
which dominated the art of the Surrealists. For them, the machine represented an intrusion,  
a menace” (Lovejoy 2004, 48). She also observes that “cultural critics [...] so deeply distrust 
technology [...] that they often do not want to look at an art that uses it as a means of representation” 
(Lovejoy 2004, 273). She correctly points out that in cinema technology is often associated  
with decay, “the process of disintegration,” with disaster (Lovejoy 2004, 301). Bar-Cohen et al.  
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speak of a pre-reflective “fear and dislike” towards and a “strong rejection” of humanlike machines, 
including anthropomorphic machine artists (Bar-Cohen et al. 2009, 6). These are all instances  
of PRHMA. Rutsky writes that art “has generally been cast as the polar opposite of modern 
technology” (Rutsky 1999, 3) and that “the conception of technology has been explicitly posed [...] 
in contrast to art, to the aesthetic sphere” (Rutsky 1999, 4). Davis mentions that pre-reflectively  
one feels or believes that technology is a “threat” to art (Davis 2004, 3), and Stephens and  
Heffernan refer to the “cultural tendency to assume that automation (or robots) and affect (art)  
are opposed” (Stephens and Heffernan 2016, 32). Finally, to make a long list short, Penny writes 
that the popular view is that “computational technologies [are] undergirded by a worldview which 
[is] fundamentally in tension with the worldview of artmaking” (Penny 2016, 47).  
It is extraordinary that, given all these reports of PRHMA, there is no discussion of its  
possible causes in philosophy of technology. The bulk of the literature on machine art is  
interested solely in (a) finding in machine artists properties we ascribe to human artists and  
(b) explaining how machines have been or can be constructed so as to exhibit such properties.  
A property that has received tremendous attention is creativity (Boden 1994; Boden 2004;  
Colton and Wiggins 2012; Paul and Kaufman 2014; Besold et al. 2015). Can drawing or dancing  
or playing music be really creative if undertaken by a robot? The assumption is that if the  
answer is “yes,” the claim for machine art is legitimized (for a challenge of this view see  
Coeckelbergh 2017, 297-300). Other alleged properties of human artists or artistic action  
(often subsumed under the label of “creativity”) that computational researchers and producers  
of machine artists have sought to transfer to robots or robotic action are improvisation (Lösel 2018; 
Lewis 2018), intentionality (Lewis 1999; Lösel 2018, 189-190; Stelarc 2018, 62), anticipation  
(Endo 2008), autonomy (Cohen 2018, 45), intuition (Cohen 2018, 48), aesthetic effects (Colton  
and Wiggins 2012), surprise (Penny 2016, 53; Moura 2016, 265), reaction (Penny 2016, 57),  
empathy (Penny 2016, 58), novelty (Moura 2016, 255, 265), and self-organization (Moura 2016, 262). 
These discussions are informative not only about the theoretical framework of artificial 
intelligence and practical puzzles concerning the construction of creative, autonomous, 
improvising, and so on, robots, but also about the nature of art and humanity and their relation  
to technology. They can also be illuminating regarding the, often confused, meaning we apply  
to such concepts as creativity, improvisation, novelty, etc. Yet, the question concerning the cause  
of PRHMA, humanity’s “immediate” or “primitive” fear and anxiety towards machine art, is at  
least equally important, even though it has received barely any attention. 
Additionally, I find the question concerning PRHMA, the question “why we fear machine 
art at all” (Coeckelbergh 2017, 296), much more interesting and philosophically valid than  
the question whether or not machine art is “really” art. The latter question is in fact unanswerable, 
for there are so many different and even opposing definitions of art (for an overview see  
Adajian 2012). Alternatively, according to the currently most influential theory of art, Dickie’s 
“institutional theory of art” (Dickie 1974), there should be no doubt that machine art can  
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“really” be art. For, as the theory tells us, whether or not a certain object is art is decided absolutely 
by “the artworld”: the artists, the critics, the gallery owners, the art public. If natural objects such  
as logs and “readymades” such as Duchamp’s Fountain can be accepted as art (Dickie 1969), then 
surely works generated by machines can also be art. All that is required in this case is the ascription 
of art status to them by the artworld. If, for example, a work created by a machine is included in  
a gallery exhibition, it is immediately given the title of an artwork. This is recognized by 
Coeckelbergh, who writes that 
 
[i]f the only thing that counts is subjective decision or social agreement, then if these are in place, this 
is all the machine needs [in order to create art]. [...] For instance, if a neural network creates something 
we (humans) call art, then it is art – end of the matter [...]. (Coeckelbergh 2017, 293)  
  
By contrast, the response to the question why humans at the pre-reflective level have fear  
and anxiety towards machine art and thereby exclude it from the domain of art remains, as 
Coeckelbergh puts it, “not clear” (Coeckelbergh 2017, 296). To take a small step towards the 
clarification of such a response is the present paper’s sole aim.  
Some weighty reasons are found in the literature concerning why humanity must invest  
in machine art: the externalization of human artistic abilities in the machine artist and hence their 
becoming observable for science (Boden 2004, 185; Edmonds 2018, 54; Colton and Wiggins 2012, 
23; Lovejoy 2004, 25; Stephens and Hefffernan 2016, 37; Bar-Cohen et al. 2009, 12), the 
enhancement of human creativity through the realization of intricate projects that could not be 
realized without the involvement of computing and robotics (McCormack and d’Inverno 2012, 
422; Coeckelbergh 2017, 297-298; Poltronieri et al. 2018, 6-8, 10-13; Edmonds 201851, 54;  
Kidner 2018; Lovejoy 2004, 69), the disclosure of new dimensions of reality and the subsequent 
expansion of humanity’s knowledge and appreciation of reality, especially given that our world  
has now acquired an undeniably “technological” character (Coeckelbergh 2017, 300; Poltronieri  
et al. 2018, 15-17; Willats 2011; Colton and Wiggins 2012, 24; Lovejoy 2004, 8, 271-276; Penny 
2016, 63), and the humanization of science (Poltronieri et al. 2018, 7; Lovejoy 2004, 69, 280).  
Given the reality and importance of these gains, what could cause PRHMA? As noted, there is  
no reflection on this issue in the literature, only marginalized, sporadic remarks. My survey of  
the literature has disclosed the following as the most agreed upon reasons for PRHMA: (a) the  
lack of autonomy in machine art, (b) the lack of spirituality in machine art, (c) the lack of 
consciousness in machine art, and (d) the threat machine art poses for human survival. I will  
now discuss each of these in turn.  
 
Coeckelbergh suggests that PRHMA is due to the assumption that machine artists are  
“merely programmed” (Coeckelbergh 2017, 286), and Nake reports that the public’s reaction to 
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early computer artworks was that “even randomness [in computer art] [...] was not really random 
but only calculated pseudo-randomness, the type of randomness possible on a digital computer.  
A fake, from start to end, christened as art!” (Poltronieri et al. 2018, 5, my emphasis). Stelarc  
also remarks that “there has always been a fear of the involuntary and the automated” (Stelarc  
2018, 59). The suggestion is that PRHMA is caused by a sense of lack of autonomy in machine  
art: the machine artwork is simply the result of the pushing of a button by the machine’s 
autonomous human creator. The machine has not made any autonomous decisions during the 
process of artistic creation, precisely because it is unable to do so. 
One can find hints of three responses to such a view in the literature. First, it is argued that  
even if machine art resulted solely from a programmed activity, it cannot be excluded from art’s 
domain. As noted, there is no universally accepted definition of “art” and, moreover, Dickie’s 
“institutional theory of art” would allow the incorporation of machine products into the domain  
of art, even if these resulted from a programmed activity (Coeckelbergh 2017, 286). In other words,  
it is not universally accepted that not-being-programmed or exhibiting autonomy is a necessary 
condition of art.  
Second, it is argued that the view under discussion assumes that human art is free from 
programming, that humans, in general, and human artists, in particular, have free will. This, 
however, is a philosophical puzzle that has not yet been resolved to universal satisfaction. Yet,  
this does not prevent one from referring to human art and human artists. Humans have themselves 
been created, in one way or another, and their physiological, biological, chemical, and so  
on, structure has its own “fixed” characteristics, its own “programming” or “simple rules.” If  
there is no free will, art results from this fixed structure. In this case we would not say there is no  
art because the human artist has been created and has a fixed structure. Art seems independent  
of these considerations. In the same way, there does not seem to be any ground for claiming  
that machine art is not really art because the machine is programmed. If the programmed  
human structure does not prevent us from accepting human art, the programmed machine 
structure should not prevent us from accepting machine art. As Coeckelbergh notes, if we  
accept “the idea that human beings are created but then in turn themselves become creators,”  
we have to accept that although a machine’s algorithm or code is created by humans, that  
machine can be a creator (Coeckelbergh 2017, 286).  
Third, it is argued that it is false to claim that machine artists are “merely programmed,”  
that they exhibit no autonomy. Robots equipped with sensors can collect information which  
they subsequently use in order to change their behaviour during the artistic process, showing thereby 
that the artwork does not result merely from the programming/code. Mura makes a strong case  
for such an argument. He writes that  
 
we may [...] recognize a certain degree of autonomy in creative machines. They can do things that are 
not programmed and/or result from an internal information gathering device. (Moura 2016, 255)  
Humanities Bulletin, Volume 3, Number 2, 2020 
15 
The gathering of information enables the robot “to generate novelty,” escaping thereby  
any predetermined trajectory (Moura 2016, 255). There still are, of course, simple rules – as there are 
in all beings, including humans – but the combination of these with collected information  
and emergent behaviour enables robots to “create pictorial compositions that are not predetermined” 
(Moura 2016, 255).  
Moura put this in practice in 2003 with ArtSBot (Art Swarm Robots), a group of robots  
able to interact with one another at a certain setting (the canvas) via their sensors, controller,  
and actuators. The sensors receive signals from the environment (the painted trails left behind  
by the robots), which are then processed by the microcontroller, commanding thereby the  
actuators. The robots avoid each other by means of the proximity sensors and establish 
communication only through the painted trail left on the canvas by a previous movement.  
They work through what Grassé called “stigmergy,” an agent’s behaviour resulting from the  
effects appearing in a setting due to the action of other agents (Grassé 1959). Based on preexisting 
trails and the collected information, the robots create – collectively – exquisite paintings of  
abstract art. The whole process is stopped by the viewer when she feels that “the painting is  
‘just right’” (Moura 2016, 265).  
In 2006 Moura created RAP (Robotic Action Painter), “an individual robot artist [...] able  
to determine, by its own means, the moment in which the painting is finished” (Moura 2016, 265). 
RAP decides to finish the painting when the chaos of its painted brushes gives place to a form  
that feels right to it. Before this, the algorithm determining RAP’s microcontroller leads (a) to a 
random behaviour that follows the encounter of white and (b) to a structured feedback behaviour 
when a colour other than white is met. The combination of these two behaviours leads to the 
emergence of a discrete pattern, recognized by the robot as a well-defined composition. Moura gives 
us his own evaluation of the project: 
 
RAP creates artworks based on its own assessment of the world. At any given moment the robot ‘knows’ 
its situation and acts accordingly. It scans constantly the canvas for data retrieving. It uses its relative 
position in the space as a real random generator. It builds gradually a composition based on emergent 
properties. It decides what to do and when to do it. It finishes the process using its particular ‘sense of 
rightness’. Although the human contribution in building the machine and feeding it with some basic 
rules is still significant, the essential aspects of RAP’s creativity stems from the information that the robot 
gathers by its own means from the environment. In this sense RAP’s art must be seen as a unique creation 
independent of the human artist that was at the origin of the process. (Moura 2016, 267)  
 
And he concludes, polemically, thus: 
 
My painting robots were created to paint. Not my paintings but their own paintings. The essential  
of their creations stems from the machine’s own interpretation of the world and not from its human 
description. No previous plan, fitness, aesthetic taste or artistic model is induced. These robots are machines 
dedicated to their art. (Moura 2016, 267) 
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If there is robotic artistic action driven not only by simple rules but also by collection of 
information and emergent behaviour, it is, I think, impossible to argue that this action does not 
involve some autonomy.  
Note, however, that the above three responses are objections pertaining to a thesis about  
the art status of machine art (“machine art is not really art”), while the thesis under discussion is a 
thesis pertaining to the hostility against machine art (“there is a pre-reflective fear of machine art”). 
That is to say, all objections, which dominate the literature regarding the issue of machine art’s 
autonomy, responded to the view that there is no autonomy in machine art in such a way as to 
undermine the claim that machine art is not really art. Yet, what we were expecting is an illumination 
of the suggestion that the absence of autonomy in machine art causes PRHMA. None of the three 
responses we discussed offers such an illumination because they focus on the art status of machine 
art instead of on PRHMA.  
Could, then, the lack of autonomy in machine art, if it existed, function as the cause of 
PRHMA? In my view, it could not, because the absence of autonomy in machine art would not 
obstruct the art receiver’s obtaining or experiencing the desideratum of autonomy in art if she  
chose to abandon machine art and turn to human art instead. In simpler words, that there is lack  
of autonomy in machine art cannot cause fear in a human’s heart, for that human can experience 
autonomy in art by simply moving to human art. S fears X because of Y only if there is no obvious 
way for S to avoid Y. The appeal to lack of autonomy (Y) does not provide such a scenario: one  
can quite simply ignore machine art and pursue only human art, finding therein the autonomy one 
desires. Thus, PRHMA could not be caused or explained by the belief that there is no autonomy in 
machine art.  
 
Another reason for PRHMA frequently mentioned in the literature is that machine art lacks 
spirituality. Spirituality is a sense of belonging to a whole, to eternity or divinity, to something more 
meaningful than everydayness’s hustle and bustle. Spirituality is often associated with mystery and 
“mysticism” or “magic” and the feeling of being in contact with the fundamental – often occult – 
forces permeating the cosmos. The idea here is that machine art has a character – caused by the 
“technological” element in it – that prevents or hinders its human receivers from acquiring or 
participating in spirituality and that this is the reason why there is PRHMA. Machine art is 
conceived of as an obstacle to a human being’s connecting with the eternal, divine, and holistic 
aspects of her environment.  
There have been reactions to the idea that machine art or “the technological” in general is an 
obstacle to spirituality. It has been suggested that technology is, essentially, an expression mediated  
by numbers and geometrical forms, which, since antiquity, are considered by many as the most 
appropriate symbols of wholeness and eternity. The Pythagoreans and some schools of Platonism,  
for example, regarded numbers and geometrical forms as the ultimate components of reality and truth. 
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Since these elements are fundamentally involved in technology, the latter necessarily has a spiritual 
dimension.  
Rutsky expresses this well: 
 
[Contemporary] aesthetics attempts to reconcile the aesthetic with the technological. To this end, it 
often connects the spiritual and the technological, attempting to impart a sense of wholeness and  
the eternal to technological forms. Thus, mathematical and abstract geometric forms are figured as 
having spiritual attributes, as reflecting eternal forms and values. Often, as in Bruno Taut’s Glass 
Pavilion, these aestheticized technological forms were explicitly designed as a kind of spiritual edifice,  
a symbol of unity for the fragmented modern city. Through this aestheticized technology, not only is  
the aura of the artwork maintained, but there is often an attempt to extend it to society in general, as a 
means of reinvesting modern society with a sense of spirituality and wholeness. (Rutsky 1999, 9)  
 
 Rutsky proceeds by noting that the emphasis given in contemporary aesthetics to the 
association of the technological with spirituality is a reaction to the basic tenet of artistic modernism, 
in particular, and modernity, in general, to assume an unbridgeable gap between spirituality, on  
the one hand, and reason, science, and technology, on the other hand. Modernity understood 
spirituality as “magical,” “mythical,” and “irrational,” and placed it wholly in the pre-modern world. 
It conceived of itself as the force that “liberates” the world from “spirit” and establishes the kingdom 
of reason, exemplified by science and technology (Rutsky 1999, 10).  
Rutsky links contemporary aesthetics’ attempt to re-spiritualize technology with “high tech,” 
which, as his detailed analyses show, is driven more by aesthetic rather than by functional concerns and 
features. The aestheticism of high tech is explicitly associated with primordial, magical, mythical,  
and spiritual structures by such movements and discourses as techno-paganism, “new-edge” science, 
cyber-shamanism, and rave culture. As Rutsky observes, “techno-pagans, for example, see the techno-
cultural world as magical, as inhabited by unseen forces, spirits, gods” (Rutsky 1999, 18). 
A similar approach can be found in Davis, who argues that the spirituality of old did not  
vanish with the advent of modern science and technology; it rather clandestinely infiltrated 
scientific-technological discourse, determining thereby the fundamental structures of science and 
technology. Here is a passage that encapsulates Davis’s thesis: 
 
[C]ommon sense tells us that mysticism has [nothing] in common with technology [...]. Historians and 
sociologists inform us that the West’s mystical heritage of occult dreamings, spiritual transformations, and 
apocalyptic visions crashed on the scientific shores of the modern age. According to this narrative, 
technology has helped disenchant the world, forcing the ancestral symbolic networks of old to give way to 
the crisp, secular game plans of economic development, skeptical inquiry, and material progress. But the old 
phantasms and metaphysical longings did not exactly disappear. In many cases, they disguised themselves 
and went underground, worming their way into the cultural, psychological, and mythological motivations 
that form the foundations of the modern world. [...] [M]ystical impulses sometimes body-snatched the very 
technologies that supposedly helped yank them from the stage in the first place. (Davis 2004, 5)  
Ioannis Trisokkas – What is Wrong with Machine Art? Autonomy, Spirituality, Consciousness, and Human Survival 
18 
 Yet another similar position is Couliano’s, who writes that 
 
[h]istorians have been wrong in concluding that magic disappeared with the advent of “quantitative 
science.” The latter has simply substituted itself for a part of magic while extending its dreams and  
its goals by means of technology. Electricity, rapid transport, radio and television, the airplane, and the 
computer have merely carried into effect the promises first formulated by magic, resulting from the 
supernatural processes of the magician: to produce light, to move instantaneously from one point in 
space to an other, to communicate with faraway regions of space, to fly through the air, and to have an 
infallible memory at one’s disposal. (Couliano 1987, 104)  
 
I do not have the space here to describe in detail Rutsky’s, Davis’s, and Culiano’s excellent 
analyses of how the spirituality of old has infiltrated and manifests itself in the fundamental  
structure of modern technology (for similar positions see Yates 1966, 224; Dery 1996; Penczak 2001; 
Kaldera and Schwartzstein 2002; Vedro 2007). What is significant for my purposes is only that  
there exists contemporary research undermining the idea that technology, and hence machine art,  
is devoid of spirituality. This means that PRHMA, if it is caused by that idea, can be challenged: 
there is nothing in principle obstructing an art receiver from finding spirituality in machine art,  
and, therefore, humans should not be hostile towards machine art.  
Yet, this argument works only if PRHMA is indeed caused by the belief that there is lack  
of spirituality in machine art. The positions we discussed do not argue for or against this causal  
thesis. They rather accept it and attempt to show that it is unjustified, believing that if they are 
successful, the hostility against technology and machine art will disappear or be reduced. In this  
way, however, the very phenomenon of such hostility remains unexplained. 
Thus, the question is whether or not PRHMA could be caused by the belief that machine  
art lacks spirituality. In my view, it could not. The argument for this assertion has the same form as 
the one provided against the view that PRHMA is caused by the belief that machine art lacks 
autonomy: if the receivers of machine art believed or felt that machine art lacks spirituality,  
they could easily turn to human art, where they could find the spirituality they were looking  
for. The easiness with which an art receiver could move from machine art to human art and  
thereby obtain spirituality excludes the possibility that machine art could generate fear and anxiety 
in the receiver because of lack of spirituality. The most one would encounter here is indifference 
towards machine art. The crucial point is that the desideratum, spirituality, is acquired by one’s 
simply abandoning or ignoring machine art. One’s realizing that one can fully satisfy one’s desire  
for Y by easily moving from X to Z is a condition that excludes the possibility that one is strongly 
hostile towards X because of lack of Y in X.  
 
Yet another reason for PRHMA mentioned in the literature is that machine artists are not 
conscious of their creations, that, in general, machines lack consciousness. Sometimes this lack of 
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consciousness is associated with lack of uniqueness, to wit, with the understanding of machines  
as facilitators of mass production (Lovejoy 2004, 2). This, however, is certainly a false assumption, 
for the machine artists of the twentieth century are producers of unique artworks. As Stephen and 
Heffernan put it, twentieth-century machine artworks  
 
seemed highly civilized and benigh, and far removed from the world of factories and mass production. They 
were made as exquisite and unique objects, increasingly at a remove from the mass-produced objects and 
industrial machines that came to define the nineteenth century. (Stephens and Heffernan 2016, 34)  
 
At any case, there is no obvious necessary correlation between lack of consciousness and  
lack of uniqueness (mass production): a robot can be employed only for the creation of unique 
artworks.  
Moura argues that the lack of consciousness in machine artists does not undermine machine 
art, because the presence of consciousness in the artist is not a necessary condition of the work  
being an artwork. There have been cases of great artistic movements where non-consciousness  
or unconsciousness was explicitly demanded, as, for example, in Surrealism or in certain strands  
of abstract art. Here is Moura: 
 
It is true that consciousness is lacking to this [robotic] creativity. But if we look at the history of modern 
art, it is obvious that, for example, surrealism tried to produce artworks exactly in these same terms. The 
“pure psychic automatism,” the quintessential definition of the movement itself, appeared as a 
spontaneous, non-conscious and without any aesthetic or moral intention technique. In the first 
Surrealist Manifesto André Breton (1924) defined the concept in this way: “Pure psychic automatism 
by which it is intended to express, either verbally or in writing, the true function of thought. Thought 
dictated in the absence of all control exerted by reason, and outside all aesthetic or moral preoccupations.” 
In the field of the visual arts, Jackson Pollock was the artist that better fulfills this intention by splashing 
ink onto the canvas with the purpose of representing nothing but the action itself. This was coined 
Action Painting, as it is well-known. Perhaps, because of that, the first paintings from my robots are, 
aesthetically, so similar to the ones of Pollock or André Masson, another important automatism-based 
painter. In his surrealist period, this artist tried frequently to prompt a low conscious state by going 
hungry, not sleeping or taking drugs, so that he could release himself from any rational control and 
therefore letting emerge what at the time, in the path of Freud, was called the subconscious. The absence 
of conscience, external control or pre-determination, allow these painting robots to engender creativity 
in its pure state, without any representational, aesthetic or moral intention. (Moura 2016, 259)  
  
Moura, then, argues that while lack of consciousness is a reality in machine art, the latter  
can still be art, for, like the surrealists or certain human painters of abstract art who promoted 
unconscious or non-conscious artistic action, machine artists can in principle create unique  
artworks that will be baptized as “art” by the artworld.  
As before, though, we notice that this argument does not address the issue of PRHMA  
and hence it cannot function as its explanans. All it manages is to cast doubt on the thesis  
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that machine art is not really art. The crucial question, which Moura does not address, is whether  
or not the belief that machine art lacks consciousness causes PRHMA. 
In my view, the machine artists’ lack of consciousness cannot be the explanans of the  
pre-reflective fear or anxiety towards machine art. This is so because, reiterating the pattern  
of argument with which we concluded the two previous sections, the art receiver could very  
easily sidestep or ignore machine art and simply focus on human art if she thought consciousness  
is important for art and can be found only in human art. In other words, lack of consciousness  
in machine art does not seem threatening to the art receiver insofar as the latter has still the option 
of human art. In this way, a necessary condition for the possibility of fear or anxiety, that is,  
the feeling of threat, is missing and hence PRHMA remains unexplained. 
There are some other reasons mentioned in the literature in apparent relation to the 
phenomenon of PRHMA, such as machine artists’ lack of skill (Lovejoy 2004, 43), lack of  
effort (Colton 2008; Kidner 2018, 88; Colton and Wiggins 2012, 25), and lack of emotions 
(Coeckelbergh 2017, 290-291; Lovejoy 2004, 22-23; Stelarc 2018, 66; Colton and Wiggins 2012, 25; 
Moura 2016, 262-263). As with the reasons we have already examined, however, these other  
reasons exhibit the same two problems. First, in actuality the emphasis is put on developing a  
critique of these reasons from the perspective of the issue of whether or not machine art is  
“really” art. The initial suggestion that they can explain PRHMA is never developed in the  
ensuing debates. Second, and more importantly, a pattern has now emerged, which reveals that  
all reasons having the form “machine art lacks X” cannot explain PRHMA, since any art receiver 
could very easily turn her attention to human art instead and thereby find therein whatever  
she thinks is the desideratum missing from machine art. Humans would be tolerant to machine  
art insofar as human art remains as an alternative option and satisfies their desiderata or 
requirements. This precludes any suggestion that the belief that machine art lacks X is the  
explanans of PRHMA. Fear and anxiety towards machine art could be generated only in the case 
that machine art can be perceived as posing real threat to humanity. Such a perception surfaces 
occasionally in the literature, even though discussions of it remain superficial. Let us now turn  
our attention to this issue.  
 
PRHMA is often associated with issues pertaining to human survival. These issues fall  
into two broad categories, namely, first, issues having to do specifically with the economic 
dimension of an individual’s life and, second, issues having to do with an individual’s safety  
in general. In both categories a threat is specified that relates to the notion of machines’ “taking 
over.” Coeckelbergh, for example, very thoughtfully notes that PRHMA can be  
 
part of a broader discourse and anxieties [...] concerning the question if machines will take over, if  
they will make humans obsolete in a lot, if not all, domains of previously exclusively human activities. 
(Coeckelbergh 2017, 287, my emphasis) 
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Coeckelbergh’s point is that humans pre-reflectively have fear and anxiety towards machine 
art because they have a belief or a feeling that machines will “take over” human life and thereby  
make the human element, in some sense, obsolete. It is because of this fear and this anxiety that some 
people “see it as their mission to defend ‘humanity’ against ‘the machines’” (Coeckelbergh 2017, 296). 
Fear towards machine art is mediated by fear towards machines in general. In other words, machine 
art is understood here as part of technology or the mechanization of life in general. 
A first economic consequence of machines’ “taking over” that is quite often discussed in  
the literature is unemployment, which is a phenomenon belonging to the wider problematic of 
human survival. Coeckelbergh is once more spot on when he writes the following: 
 
[C]onsider for instance the discussion about robots in healthcare or the discussion about automation 
and employment: will robots replace nurses and perhaps replace all kinds of jobs previously done by 
humans? (Coeckelbergh 2017, 287)  
 
That robots pose a real threat to human employment is confirmed by Bar-Cohen et al., who write that  
 
[a]s humanlike robots become more capable and useful, one can envision that years from now they may 
become our household appliances or even our peers, and we may use them to perform difficult and complex 
tasks as well as possibly to replace unskilled human laborers. (Bar-Cohen et al. 2009, 5-6, my emphasis)  
 
In fact, in Japan humanoid robots are already populating shopping malls and are quite  
a commercial success, increasingly replacing more and more human labourers, especially in such 
professions as hospital and home healthcare workers, receptionists, security guards, and tourist 
guides (Bar-Cohen et al., 21).  
Even if one could object that machines cannot really take over all human jobs, it is certainly  
a cause of concern that contemporary researchers in computational creativity have explicitly 
expressed the desire to promote machine art to such a degree and in such a way that an enormous 
amount of machine artworks will be distributed commercially through the Internet. This vision 
seems to have the consequence that a large portion of the artworks sold will be machine artworks. 
Consider, for example, the following telling thought by Colton and Wiggins:  
 
Currently, having a bespoke painting, poem or piece of music created is the privilege of the few. However, 
one day, the needs of the many will outweigh the needs of the few, and we will expect the Internet to provide 
new ideas and new artefacts on demand, just like we expect it right now to provide old ideas and old 
artefacts. We will go online for: a new, relevant, joke for a speech; an exciting new recipe for a party; or a 
bespoke and beautiful new painting for a present. We cannot expect the world’s creative people alone to 
supply artefacts for such a huge demand, so autonomously creative software will be necessary. The 
research in Computational Creativity projects – to help break the final frontier in AI research – will be 
pivotal in bringing about this technological and cultural revolution. (Colton and Wiggins 2012, 25)  
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If machine art became so widespread and easily accessible on the internet, it would not be  
an exaggeration to see it as causing increase of unemployment to human artists in the artworld.  
A second economic consequence of machines’ “taking over” that is also frequently  
mentioned in the literature is the capital’s use of machines in order to establish lower wages and  
to make it even harder than before for the workers to protest against their employers (for fear  
of being replaced by a machine). Nake, for one, insists that machines are tools in the hands of  
“the rich and the ruling” with which they exert an even greater control over the workers. Nake,  
a pioneer in computer art, expressed this thought in a 1971 paper entitled “There Should be  
no Computer Art” (Nake 1971). This classic paper makes apparent in the most luminous manner 
the pre-reflective fear humans have of machine art, and that this fear stems from general  
concerns about machines’ affecting the economic flourishing of individuals.  
Rutsky explains that at its very inception modernity distinguished itself from the  
medieval “dark ages,” from pre-modernity, via what he calls “the instrumental conception  
of technology” (Rutsky 1999, 2). This conception was that technology is the means or “the 
instrument” for the moderns “to know and control the world” (Rutsky 1999, 2). Gradually, 
however, and as the involvement of machines in human life became increasingly deeper,  
humans started developing a parallel sentiment, that of fear. Fear was fully justified as machines 
indeed increased unemployment and the gulf between rich and poor, and contributed to  
making the workers’ life entirely miserable. The rich owned technology and used it to control  
the workers’ wages and labour even more than before. Wood writes that throughout the  
nineteenth century “factory workers came to feel they had been reduced to the mechanical  
pieces they were in charge of producing, hour after hour, day after day” (Wood 2007). This  
situation led to Marx’s and Engels’s cry that humans have become a mere “appendage” of the 
machines that “enslaved” them (Marx and Engels 2008, 34). Rutsky remarks that “despite the 
pronouncements of various technological ‘visionaries’ and corporate chiefs detailing how ‘high  
tech’ will ‘democratize’ society, enabling universal access, participation, and control over one’s life, 
high technology remains a ‘tool’ for distinguishing social classes” (Rutsky 1999, 3).  
As noted, PRHMA is associated in the literature not only with issues having to do with  
the economic dimension of an individual’s life, but also with issues having to do with an  
individual’s overall safety. Such issues relate to scenarios envisioning that robots will one day  
gain the upper hand in their symbiosis with humans. In fact, as Bar-Cohen et al. convincingly  
show, there is real danger that, unless precautionary measures are taken, machines will pose a  
threat to human safety in the not so distant future. The following passage is long but greatly  
illuminating: 
 
Humanlike robots are being developed to be smart, mobile, and autonomous machines. These 
capabilities would make them quite powerful. Under certain circumstance, they may also become 
dangerous to us. Although this technology may improve our lives, it can also cause complications or even 
terrible destruction if we are not very careful. Some of the concerns may include ethical questions and 
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potential dangers to humans resulting from unlawful acts. To prevent such dangers, we must address the 
potential concerns long before the possibility of their becoming superior to us is realized. 
In order to get the most benefit from their advancing capabilities it is important to channel their 
development into positive directions and protect ourselves from the negative possibilities. If humanlike 
robots become more capable and equipped with simulated cognition there will be legitimate concern 
regarding their continued “loyalty” to us. One may wonder what would happen if they take on 
questionable roles such as acting as a specific person’s clone and then commit a crime, or have access to 
our assets and private or intimate information and possibly do something to hurt us using our 
information. Science fiction movies and books are creating public misconceptions of what humanlike 
robots can do and the danger that they may pose. Yet, as science-fiction ideas are rapidly becoming an 
engineering reality, it is increasingly becoming important to try to envision the potential issues of concern 
that may arise and find ways to stave off the possible negative outcomes. (Bar-Cohen et al. 2009, 17)  
 
It is not only that an individual citizen’s life can be affected negatively by human  
criminals’ using robots for their illegal tasks. There is also the very realistic scenario that robots  
will one day “surpass human levels of intelligence” and “develop a will of their own,” which in 
circumstances of tension could lead them to form military robotic groups that will be unbeatable  
in the battlefield (Bar-Cohen 2009, 18). To make a long story short, Bar-Cohen et al. affirm  
a realistic possibility that humans one day may become slaves to robots or even be annihilated  
by them. This is not actually a “fantastical” or “unrealizable” projection: imagine only what  
could happen if highly intelligent, skillful and literally fearless robots learned to mechanically fix  
and even build other robots. 
It is the combination of projections (but also actualities) of economic and physical dangers 
posed by robots that generate the pre-reflective sentiments of fear and anxiety, the general  
pre-reflective hostility, towards robotic technology. Since machine art involves such technology,  
it receives that hostility as well.  
One may object that machine art does not have an obvious economic or military function,  
as robots – as we have just seen – certainly have, so it does not itself pose any threat to humanity. 
Machine art does not itself cause unemployment to workers in general, and even the idea that it  
can cause unemployment to artists is somewhat far-fetched, given the enormous amount of funding 
a project of machine art currently requires. Machine art does not seem to have much relevance  
to situations of military control and policing, or to situations of class struggle and social division. 
Why, then, should we accept that PRHMA is caused by the humans’ believing or feeling that their 
survival is threatened by machine art? 
This objection overlooks a significant fact about human psychology, to wit, that it transfers 
sentiments from a general domain to its parts and/or extensions. Humans fear – pre-reflectively – 
robotic technology and transfer this fear to anything that involves such technology, including 
machine art. Humans see in machine art a “symbol” or a “sign” of the expansion of machines in  
their lives. Machine art is not itself a threat to humanity, but humans “see” it as or “feel” that it is  
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an extension of robotic technology in general, which they pre-reflectively consider, for the reasons 
we have specified, to be such a threat.  
Crucially, note that this explanation does not succumb to the difficulty that the previously 
discussed explanations face. Here the art receiver cannot simply sidestep or ignore machine art  
and turn her attention to human art instead. This will not remove the threat to her survival. If  
the art receiver does not find skill in machine art and seeks skill in art, she can very easily turn  
to human art. By contrast, if the art receiver finds machine art threatening to her survival (in  
the “symbolic” fashion I explained above), this threat will remain even if she turns to human art. 
The difference between the explanation based on the threat to human survival and the explanations 
based on lack of such an element as autonomy or spirituality or consciousness or emotion or skill, 
and so on, is that in the former case the art receiver’s turn to human art does not resolve what  
the receiver conceives of as a problem. For example, in the case of an art receiver who looks for 
spirituality in art and does not find it in machine art, her turn to human art will satisfy her demand. 
By contrast, in the case of an art receiver who thinks that machine art is a threat to her survival  
(or the survival of the human species), her turn to human art will not make her life any less  
vulnerable to the (alleged) threat posed by machines.  
Precisely because of this difference I suggest that the true explanans of PRHMA is humans’ 
“symbolic” belief that machine art is a threat to human survival. All other explanations fail to 
account for the very real existence of a pre-reflective feeling of fear or anxiety towards machine  
art. This, of course, does not mean that such a threat is real. All that matters here is that humans  
pre-reflectively imagine such a threat, either on the level of actuality or on the level of possibility.  
 
There is a well-documented pre-reflective hostility against machine art (PRHMA). How  
can it be explained? Explanations based on the (alleged) fact that machine art lacks an element  
that is (allegedly) found in human art do not work. Such explanations cannot account for the 
sentiments of fear and anxiety present in PRHMA, because the art receiver could simply turn  
to human art for finding the element she is looking for. By contrast, an explanation based on the  
idea that machine art is “symbolically” a threat to human survival can be successful, since the art 
receiver’s turning from machine art to human art does not eliminate the (alleged) “symbolic” threat 
machine art poses for human survival. If there is a pre-reflective belief or feeling that machine art  
is such a threat, then it is perfectly understandable why humans exhibit a pre-reflective hostility 






Humanities Bulletin, Volume 3, Number 2, 2020 
25 
Adajian, Thomas. “The definition of art.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Ed.) Edward Zalta. 2012. 
http//plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/art-definition 
Bar-Cohen, Yoseph, et al. The Coming Robot Revolution. New York: Springer, 2009. 
Besold, Tarek et al. Computational Creativity Research: Towards Creative Machines. London: Atlantis Press, 2015. 
Boden, Margaret. “What is creativity?” Dimensions of Creativity. (Ed.) Margaret Boden. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1994. 75-117. 
Boden, Margaret. The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms. London: Routledge, 2004. 
Brown, Mark: “Patrick Tresset’s robots draw faces and doodle when bored.” Wired. 17 June 2011. 
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/sketching-robots 
Coeckelbergh, Mark. “Can machines create art?” Philosophy of Technology 30 (2017): 285-303. 
Cohen, Harold. “A million millennial Medicis” Explorations in Art and Technology. (Ed.) Linda Candy et al. 
London: Springer, 2018. 39-50. 
Colton, Simon. “Creativity versus the perception of creativity in computational systems.” Proceedings of the 
AAAI Spring Symposium on Creative Systems 8 (2008). 
  https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Creativity-Versus-the-Perception-of-Creativity-in-
Colton/a2eab9219192b14f5019e346566668bf4986f591 
Colton, Simon and Geraint Wiggins. “Computational creativity: The final frontier.” ECAI 2012. (Ed.) Luc De 
Raedt et al. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2012. 21-26. 
Couliano, Ioan. Eros and Magic in the Renaissance. Trans. Margaret Cook. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987. 
Davis, Erik. TechGnosis: Myth, Magic and Mysticism in the Age of Information. London: Serpents Tail, 2004. 
Dery, Mark. Escape Velocity: Cyberculture at the End of the Century. New York: Grove Press, 1996. 
Dickie, George. “Defining art.” American Philosophical Quarterly 6. 3 (1969): 253-256. 
Dickie, George. Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974. 
Edmonds, Ernest. “Structure in art practice.” Explorations in Art and Technology. (Ed.) Linda Candy et al. 
London: Springer, 2018. 51-57. 
Endo, Y. Countering Murphy’s Law: The Use of Anticipation and Improvisation via an Episodic Memory in 
Support of Intelligent Robot Behaviour. PhD Dissertation. Georgia Tech University, 2008. 
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